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Abstract 
This thesis considers a manufacturer-retailer supply chain of a seasonal prod-
uct whose demand is weather sensitive. The retailer first orders from the 
manufacturer (supplier) and then sells to the market. Because of the weather 
risk, the retailer may order a low quantity. A weather-linked rebate scheme 
is shown to be able to increase the total profit of the whole supply chain and 
allows an arbitrary allocation of this profit among the two parties. We also 
study a risk-averse supply chain, and this rebate scheme still can improve 
the expected profit for the both sides under the risk constraints. 
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For many firms, weather represents an important determinant of demand 
for their products. According to an estimate by the US National Research 
Council, nearly 46% of US GDP is affected by the weather, and weather 
conditions tend to affect volume and usage more than they directly affect 
price. An exceptionally warm winter, for example, can leave utility and 
energy companies with excess supplies of oil or natural gas (because people 
need less to heat their homes). Or, an exceptionally cold summer can leave 
hotel and airline seats empty. Although the prices may change somewhat 
as a, consequence of unusually high or low demand, price adjustments don't 
necessarily compensate for lost revenues resulting from unseasonable weather. 
In the retail industry, Wal-Mart Stores Inc., the world's biggest retailer, 
said earlier last June that its inventory levels were higher than normal for 
the second straight quarter as below-normal temperatures crimped demand 
(Timberlake and Wiles 2005). The unfavorable weather condition hurts the 
demand not only in the North American, but also elsewhere. For example, 
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the UK-based Cad bury Schweppes's drinks business was hit by the cold sum-
mer weather last year, forcing the group to lower its profit expectations. The 
company said the poor sales were "in line with the industry as a whole where 
cold and wet weather in 2004 compares with record summer temperatures 
in 2003". Coca-Cola and Unilever also blamed the weather for low sales of 
soft drink and ice cream products and issued profits warnings, so did Nestle 
attribute its missing the half-year targets to the impact of poor weather on 
demand of ice-cream and bottled water (Kleiderman 2004). 
From these reports, we can see the need for companies to hedge against 
the risk caused by unexpected weather conditions. Such needs have created 
a new class of derivatives, weather derivatives. In 1997 the first over-the-
counter (OTC) weather derivative trade took place, and the field of weather 
risk management was bom. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) took 
weather derivatives a step further and introduced exchange-traded weather 
futures and options on futures in 1999 - the first products of their kind. The 
market for weather derivatives has grown tremendously. Notional value of 
CME Weather products in 2004 was $2.2 billion, and grew nine-fold to $22 
billion through September 2005，with volume surpassing 630,000 contracts 
traded. 
The original impetus of the weather derivatives market comes from the 
power and energy sectors, however, weather derivatives can be and have been 
used by other industries such as the retail business and the tourist industry. 
They use risk management products to stabilize earnings and budget volatil-
ity caused by variations in weather conditions. For instance, the order level of 
winter coats at a retail department store depends on the weather forecast for 
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the coming winter and the eventual sales depend on the actual temperature 
condition. To avoid loss of sales, contracts can be struck to hedge against 
unfavorable weather conditions. 
In this thesis, we analyze a setting for seasonal products whose demand 
is exposed to weather risks. We will present a stylized, but representative, 
modeling setting; i.e., a newsvendor problem. In the model, the supply chain 
consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. The risk-neutral manufacturer sells 
one product to a single independent retailer, and this retailer sells the goods 
to the market, whose demand is weather-sensitive. Because of weather risk, 
the retailer may order a low quantity. Then a weather-linked guarantee can 
be given by the risk-neutral manufacturer (supplier) to protect against the 
potential financial effects on the retailer. More specifically, when the retailer 
is risk-averse, manufacturer still can improve the total revenue of supply 
chain by offering this guarantee. 
Such a guarantee can be a rebate scheme that links to a weather index 
(Malinow, 2002)，the data of which is normally accessible to public at fairly 
small costs (e.g., climetrix.com). For example, consider a scenario in which 
the market demand is temperature-dependent: the higher the average sea-
sonal temperature is, the lower the market demand becomes. Then, if the 
actual seasonal average temperature is higher than a pre-determined thresh-
old temperature, then a certain amount of rebate will be paid to the retailer, 
which depends on how much the difference is; whereas if the former is lower 
than the latter, then no rebate will be given. Such a rebate scheme can 
potentially improve customer/vendor relationships and coordinate the sup-
ply chain, because the retailer will be more "aggressive" in initial inventory 
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ordering, which can improve the profit of the entire supply chain. 
In essence, weather represents just a special case of uncontrollable processes 
that affect firm's revenues (via demand of their products). In the extreme 
case when demand and the weather index have a one-to-one correspondence, 
the contract that we propose is essentially contingent on the demand real-
ization. Specifically, if the demand is below a specified level, then the rebate 
scheme is activated. Although there are many contracts which have been 
proposed/observed to increase the supply chain's total profit, to the best of 
our knowledge, such a contract structure has not been studied in the litera-
ture. For examples, buyback, revenue sharing and quantity-flexible contracts 
induce the retailer to order more than he would with just a wholesale price 
contract by giving him some downside protection: if demand is lower than 
what he orders, the retailer gets some refund. However, the weather-link 
contract departs from these standard supply-chain contracts, as it is based 
on the weather index rather than left-overs. 
Many consumer goods, including apparel, electronics, shoes, candy, and 
food, are sold through independent retailers. Because these industries face 
short product life cycles and have high product variety, such retailers could 
be more risk averse than larger retailers or integrated/chain retailers. The 
order-quantity decision of a risk-averse retailer in the newsvendor-problem 
setting (with an exogenous fixed price) has been extensively studied in liter-
atures. It has been shown that a risk-averse retailer's optimal order quantity 
(i.e., the one that maximizes the retailer's expected utility) will be smaller 
thanthe order quantity that maximizes expected profit (Eeckhoudt et al. 
1995)，and this optimal order quantity decreases with increasing risk aver-
4 
sion (Eeckhoudt et al. (1995), Agrawal and Seshadri (2000)). However, little 
is known about the rebate scheme for a risk-averse retailers. In this thesis 
we attempt to understand the channel rebate under aversion to risk. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter provides 
the background of related research. We review several literatures from two 
aspects, the first is the contract that can coordinate a supply chain, such as 
quantity discount, biiyback, quantity flexibility, and rebate; the other group 
of literatures analyzes the risk in the supply chain. 
Chapter 3 considers a rebate scheme in a single-period risk-neutral supply-
chain. In the first model, the demand is perfectly correlated with temperature 
(one-to-one correspondent), the demand distribution completely depends on 
the temperature. Then we extend the demand function in two ways, with 
a additive random variable and with a multiplicative random variable. In 
all the cases, the rebate scheme improves the expected profit of both man-
ufacturer and retailer. These results occur because, by offering rebates, the 
manufacture may share part of weather risk with the retailer. 
In Chapter 4，the impact of the rebate scheme in a risk-averse supply 
chain is studied. An agent is risk-averse if the he prefers a certain profit a 
to a risky profit, whose expected value equals a. This chapter shows that 
under the downside risk, the retailer could order less, but the rebate scheme 
still can induce the retailer order. 
Chapter 5 provides several numerical experiments and analysis to demon-
strate the results in chapter 3 and 4, and chapter 6 concludes this thesis with 




2.1 Supply Chain Contracts 
Recent years have seen a growing interest among both academics and prac-
titioners in supply chain contracts. Many forms of supply chain contracts 
have been implemented in industries and studied by researchers. In this 
section, we review several streams of literature that are related to our prob-
lem, which all are based on the recognition of double marginalization issue 
(Spenglei, (1950)). The review is not meant to be exhaustive, but instead 
to be brief. Interested readers can refer to a few survey papers for more 
comprehensive treatment of the literature, such as Cachori (2003), and Tsay, 
Nahmias and Agrawal (1999). 
In the supply chain management literature, a typical vertical supply 
chain, or supply channel, consists of two agents: one supplier and one re-
tailer. They make decisions in a sequence with one agent being the leader 
and the other being the follower. When these two agents coordinate by con-
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tracting on a set of transfer payments such that each firm's objective becomes 
aligned with the whole channel's objective, the optimal performance can be 
achieved. 
The first scheme that is capable of coordinating a supply chain is a non-
linear quantity dependent pricing scheme, including quantity discount and 
two-part tariff. In a two-part tariff contract, the manufacturer charges the 
retailer a fixed fee for participation and sells all additional units at a uniform 
unit price. A quantity discount contract does not include a fixed fee. The 
manufacturer charges a higher price for the first few units, then drops the 
wholesale price to induce the retailer to purchase additional units. Differ-
ent models of these contracts can be found in many papers; e.g., Jeuland 
and Shugan (1983) consider a deterministic and price-sensitive demand, and 
Weng (1995) extends the former by specifically incorporating the mechanisms 
that determine the relationship between operating decisions (such as order 
quantities and selling prices) and profits for the channel members. Mona-
han (1984) and Lee and Rosenblatt (1986) address simple discount schedules 
from the suppliers point of view. Interestingly, the benefits of discounts do 
not all accrue to the buyer(s), but instead both parties can benefit. As to 
be seen, our weather-linked rebate scheme that is offered by the supplier can 
also benefit both himself and the retailer. Although it is similar to a discount 
as it is linked to the retailers order quantity, the rebate scheme in this thesis 
is quite different as the rebated quantity is contingent on a weather index. 
Another popular contract is the buyback policy and its variants; e.g., 
Pasternack (1985) studies a buyback contract for a supplier-retailer supply 
chain where demand is stochastic and the retail price is exogenous. Note that 
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when the retail price is determined by the retailer, such a contract can not co-
ordinate a supply chain (Emmons and Gilbert (1998)). Extensions based on 
the buyback scheme include asymmetric information, service and quality is-
sues (Kandel (1996)), retailer competitions (Padmanabhan and Png (1997)), 
demand information updating (Donohiie (2000)), two echelon inventory sys-
tems (Cachon and Zipkin 1999), risk-free returns to the supplier (Webster 
and Weng 2000), and mid-life and end-life buybacks ( Taylor (2002a)). A 
similar contract is the quantity flexibility (QF) (Tsay 1999), which allows 
the buyer to adjust the order quantity upward and downward, within fixed 
bounds. Contracts with certain quantity flexibility is also embedded in the 
quick response contract (Iyer and Bergen (1997)), which is however designed 
to improve the supply chains efficiency but not explicitly for supply chain co-
ordination. Another related contract is the revenue sharing contract which 
has also been implemented in industries and drawn attentions from the aca-
demic research. With a revenue sharing contract,the supplier first charges a 
wholesale price per unit purchased, and the retailer then shares a percentage 
of her revenue with the supplier (as well the leftover). Under certain condi-
tions, a revenue sharing contract is equivalent to a buyback contract (Cachon 
and Lariviere (2005)). 
The contract studied in this thesis is a rebate contract. When rebates 
are utilized in a two-echelon environment, i.e., a supply chain with a manu-
facturer and a retailer, they can be classified into two different types. The 
first is the retailer rebate (or channel rebate), which is a payment from a 
manufacturer to a retailer based on the amount of retailer sales to end con-
sumers. The second is the consumer rebate, where the payment is made by 
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the manufacturer to the end customer via a coupon. 
Retailer rebates, which are the focus of this thesis, have two common 
forms: linear rebates, in which the rebates is paid for each unit sold; and 
target rebates, in which the rebate is paid for each unit sold beyond a specified 
target threshold T. This scheme has been studied by Taylor (2002b). His 
work is close in spirit to the basic model that we will address. He considered 
the problem of channel coordination under target rebates with sales effort 
effects. However, in our model, the weather index is considered and the 
rebates are based on the retailers order quantity and realized demand instead 
of a target sales level. 
In the economics literature, a number of studies have been conducted 
to explain why rebates are used. Some studies have been performed on 
the use of manufacturer rebates as a means of price discrimination (see for 
example, Gerstner et al. 1994). On the other hand, Gerstner and Hess 
(1991) have developed a model to demonstrate that a manufacturer may find 
it profitable to offer rebates even when price discrimination does not occur, 
i.e., when the return rate of the rebate is 100%. In their model, they assume 
the existence of two groups of consumers with different reservation prices 
and different buyback costs, where all cost parameters are deterministic. 
Ault et al. (2000) have developed a deterministic multi-period inventory 
model and used it to demonstrate that manufacturer rebates can be used 
to increase the profits of manufacturers by mitigating arbitrage by retailers 
across temporally separated markets. 
Our model differs from these models in that we assume the retailer is 
facing a single-period stochastic demand, and we identify conditions under 
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which the manufacturer and the retailer will benefit from the manufacturer 
rebate. One of our major findings is that for weather-sensitive products (sales 
depend on temperature), a rebate scheme can always increase both parties's 
profit in the supply chain. 
2.2 Risk Aversion 
Although there are considerable literatures devoted to contracts that coor-
dinate a supply chain, many of them have assumed that the agents in the 
supply chain are risk-neutral, i.e., they maximize their respective expected 
profits. It is only recently that risk analysis has been considered in opera-
tional contexts. Next, we review articles dealing with decision making by 
risk-averse agents in a supply chain. 
Eeckhoudt et al. (1995) consider a risk-averse newsvender problem, and 
give examples in which price-taking, risk-averse retailers will not stock an 
item due to high demand uncertainty. Agrawal and Seshadri (2000b) study 
pricing and order quantity decisions for a risk-averse retailer whose utility 
function is assumed to be increasing and concave. They show that, in com-
parison to a risk-neutral retailer, a risk-averse retailer will charge a higher 
price and order less if the change of the optimal price affects the scale of the 
demand distribution, whereas he will charge a lower price if the changes only 
affects the location of the demand distribution. In another paper (Agrawal 
and Seshadri (2000a))，they consider a single period model in which multi-
ple risk-averse retailers purchase a single product from a common supplier, 
and show that the mutually beneficial risk sharing contracts can be used by 
10 
an intermediary to raise the retailer's order quantity to the expected value 
maximizing quantity. 
Tsay (2002) examines how risk aversion (sensitivity to risk) affects behav-
iors of both manufacturer and retailer, and how these dynamics are altered 
by a manufacturer return policy. This investigation studied not only a man-
ufacturer dominated channel, but also one defined by a powerful retailer. He 
shows that the behaviors under risk aversion can be qualitatively different 
from those predicted by risk-neutral analysis. Gan et al. (2005) study a 
supply chain with a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer. As in our 
model, the risk aversion of the retailer is expressed using a downside prob-
abilistic constraint. After showing that the buy-back and revenue-sharing 
contracts may not coordinate a supply chain with a risk averse retailer, they 
propose a risk-sharing contract that coordinate the supply chain and satisfy 
the retailer's risk constraints. 
11 
Chapter 3 
Rebate Scheme in a 
Risk-Neutral Supply Chain 
Suppose that a manufacturer sells a seasonal product through a single re-
tailer. The demand of the product is contingent on the weather, such as the 
average temperature. (Throughout this thesis, we use temperature as an ex-
ample, whereas other weather indexes, such as precipitation, rain-days, etc., 
can similarly be formulated). The selling price of the product is fixed and 
given exogenously. Without loss of generality, suppose that the temperature 
has adverse impact on the sales of the product, in particular, the higher the 
average temperature, the lower the seasonal demand is. 
First, we introduce the following notation. 
c - manufacturing cost per unit v - salvage value per unit 
w - wholesale price per unit s - shortage cost per unit 
p - retail price per unit k - rebate rate 
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Q - quantity ordered by retailer /(•) - probability density function of 
t - realized temperature temperature t 
t* - strike temperature F(-) - cumulative distribution 
x{t) - realized demand function of temperature t 
For the cost parameters, we impose the following conditions to avoid 
trivial solutions: (i) 0 < c < ‘ � < p; (ii) v < c\ (iii) 5 > 0. These conditions 
ensure that the product is profitable for both parties, that it is not economical 
for the manufacturer to produce simply to salvage, and that the unit shortage 
penalty is non-negative. 
We first consider a special case, in which the market demand faced by 
the retailer is perfectly correlated with temperature. This will help us gain 
insights in dealing with the general case where the demand and temperature 
are partially correlated. 
3.1 Market Demand is Perfectly Correlated 
with Temperature 
3.1.1 The Integrated Supply Chain: the Benchmark 
Suppose that the average temperature over the season, t, is uncertain, and 
the total demand faced over the selling season is monotonically decreasing 
with respect to t] i.e., if the demand is denoted as x(t), then x{t) — x{t-\-S) > 
0 for any J > 0. We first consider the centralized problem in which the 
manufacturer and retailer are managed by an integrated firm. The profit of 
13 
such an integrated system is: 
rr,门、 -cQ + vQ-s{x{t)-Q), x{t) > Q 
-cQ px{t) + v{Q - x{t)), x(t) < Q. 
So the expected profit of the entire system is: 
-KciQ) = -cQ + pE{min((5, + vE{Q - x(t)y - sE{x(t) -
fx-HQ) /-oo 
=-cQ + p Qf{t)dt+p / x{t)f{t)dt (3.1) 
J-oo 人-1(Q) 
厂 oo rx-HQ) 
+V [Q- x(t)]f{t)dt — s / {x{t) - Q)f{t)dt. 
Jx-HQ) J-oo 
Taking derivative with respect to Q yields the optimal Q � w h i c h solves 
{p + s - v)F(x-\Q,)) -{-v-c = 0. (3.2) 
3.1.2 The Decentralized Supply Chain 
We now consider a decentralized supply chain operating under a wholesale 
price contract, with wholesale price w. The retailer's problem is identical 
to that in the centralized supply chain except that w replaces c. Thus, her 
expected profit is 7Td,R{Q) if she orders Q. Denote by Qr the optimal order 
quantity for the retailer, which solves 
(p + s - v)F{x-\Qr)) + v-w = 0. (3.3) 
The manufacturer's profit is then 
7Td,MiQr) = - c)Qr. 
It is straightforward to see that Qr < Qc, so the total profit of the whole 
supply chain decreases. 
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3.1.3 Supply Chain Coordination with a Rebate 
Now suppose the manufacturer offers the retailer a rebate K{t, Q) with the 
following structure, lit <t* then no rebate is provided. On the other hand, 
K{t, Q) > 0 if i > r . The manufacturer can choose both the structure of 
Q) and the temperature threshold t*. The structure of K{t, Q) will be 
addressed later. Under such a rebate policy with t* being fixed in advance, 
the retailer's profit is 
二 _^Q + pE{min(<5，：rK))} + ;^E((Q — :r(t))+ 
-sE{x[t) - QY + 
where represents the expected profit under the rebate scheme 
K(t, Q). The expression can be simplified to 
roo 
= MRiQ) + / Kit, Q)f(t)dt. 
Jt* 
The optimal Q satisfies the first order necessary condition: 
(v + s - v)F(x-\Q)) +V-W+�服？人Q�fm = 0. (3.4) 
Jt=t* 
Comparing (3.4) with the first order condition for the centralized solution 
(3.2), it can be seen that as long as 
I ? 臂 — � 5) 
the rebate scheme can coordinate the supply chain. 
Consider an example of the scheme 
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where k is the rebate rate, and Qk is an agreed order quantity selected by 
both parties before the ordering in the contract. H e n c e ,抓品⑶ k { t — t*). 
This rebate scheme can coordinate the chain if k(t — t*) and/or t* are chosen 
such that k(t — t*)f{t)dt = w - c. 
Next, we will discuss the feasible ranges of Qk. First, if Qk = Qr, then 
with such a structure of rebate scheme, the manufacturer's profit remains 
the same as i^ dMiQr)^ i.e., his profit remains the same with and without 
rebating. This is because 
POO 
t^kMQc) 二 (W - C)Qc - / k(t-t*)(Q,-Qr)f(t}dt 
Jt* 
poo rOQ 
= [ w - c - k{t- t*)f(t)dt]Qc + Qr k(t — f ) f{t)dt 
= i w - c ) Q r , ( 3 . 6 ) 
and 
ttkAQc) = -wQc + pE{min{Qc, x{t))} + vE{Qc — rc�）+ 
-sE(x(t) - + r k{t - f)iQc - Qr)f{t)clt 
Jt* 
=1^c{Qc) - {w - c)Qr 
> T^dAQr) + T^dMiQv) - - c)Qr (3.7) 
=7rrf’fi(Qr). 
This means that the retailer gains all the incremental channel profit. Note 
that a strict inequality holds when w > cin (3.7) above. 
From the above analysis, it is easy to find that if Qk < Qr, the manufac-
turer's profit TTK^MiQc) = {iu — c)Qk < (w — c)Qr, so under this circumstance, 
the manufacturer suffers the profit loss. 
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When Qk is properly chosen to satisfy Qr < Qk < Qc, the manufacturer's 
profit now becomes (w — 6)Qk > {lu — c)Qr and hence he is better off, and 
so is the retailer. 
The last scenario is Qk > Qc, which implies that the retailer could get 
rebates only if she orders a quantity which is even larger than the channel 
optimal order quantity. However, we know that only the channel optimal 
order quantity leads to the maximum profit of the supply chain, no more no 
less, so the retailer will never order a quantity larger than Qc and rebates 
will not take place. From the above analysis, we know that the feasible range 
of Qk to achieve coordination is from Q,, to Q � 
Another way for the manufacturer to share the improved supply-chain 
profit is to set k{t — t*) and/or t* such that 0 < /(，k(t - t*)f{t)dt < w - c. 
Then, 
roo 
t^KMQC) = (yo - c)Q, - / k ( t - f ) { Q c - Q k ) f { t ) d t 
Jt* 
= { w - c - k{t - e)f(t)dt]Q, + Qk j : Kt - f ) f i t ) d t 
> {w - c)Qr. 
where the inequality holds because Qc > Qr when w > c. At the same time 
the rebate shields some risk of the retailer, and hence the retailer is better 
off as well. 
The rebate scheme we have addressed coordinates the supply chain when 
the retailer gets all the expected additional profit. The advantages are not 
only it has a simple structure, but also there is no need for the retailer to 
disclose retail price, shortage cost, salvage value, and demand distribution. 
On the other hand, manufacturer does not need to reveal his marginal pro-
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duction cost either. Because rebates are based on the realized temperature, 
strike temperature and the order quantity, which are known to both sides, 
problems caused by moral hazard and asymmetric information do not ex-
ist in our model. That is the advantages of this rebate scheme relative to 
buy-back. 
3.2 Market Demand is Partially Correlated 
with Temperature 
3.2.1 Additive Random Variable 
In the above analysis, we assumed that the demand x is perfectly negative-
correlated with temperature t. To extend the results to a general model which 
reflects the reality more truly and presents the uncertainty, we consider the 
demand with respect to temperature as the following way. First, because the 
demand is decreasing with temperature t, we denote x{t) = a — bt, where 
a and b are fixed and positive. Next, suppose there exists an independent 
random variable, e, which effects the demand in a additional way: x{t)— 
a — bt + e, where e G [ - M , M] and M is a positive number, u(e) and [/(e) 
are the probability density function and cumulative distribution function of e 
respectively. In this situation, when t > a/b the demand still could be larger 
than zero, so we have t G (—00, Then, given a order quantity Q, the 
retailer's expected profit without rebate policy, 7rrf’/?(Q), can be analyzed as 
follow. 
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(i) if Q > 2M, then the expected profit is: 
TTdAQlQ > 2M) 
fM 
= — / / \pQ-s{a-bt + e- Q)]u{e)d€f{t)dt 
J—oo J—M 
fM 
+ / / \pQ -s{a-bt + e- Q)]u{e)def{t)dt 
J-a+bt+Q 
广气 r - a + h t + Q 
+ / / [p[a -bt^e)+v{Q-a + ht- e)]u{e)def{t)dt 
气 J - M 
f 守 严 
+ / / [p(a -ht + e) + v{Q-a + bt- e)]u{e)def{t)dt 
ya-s±M J-M 
r^^ rM 
+ / ' / \p{a -bt + e)+v{Q-a + bt- e)]u{e)def{t)dt. (3.8) 
J ^ J-a+bt 
Taking the derivative of 7Td,R{Q) with respect to Q, we get, 
？ ! [ f ^ 二 + + -Q广M … f f U{-a + ht)f{t)dt 
UQ 0 Ja-M 
b 
g-Q+M 
-(p + s-i；) I ' U{-a + bt-j'Q)f(t)dt. (3.9) 
J a-Q-M 
(ii) if Q < 2M, then the expected profit is: 
TTdAQlQ < 2M) 
M 
二 -wQ+ / / \pQ - s{a-bt + e- Q)]u{e)def{t)dt 
J—OO J — M 
(i — M 似 
+ I I \pQ-s{a-bt + e- Q)]u{€)d€f{t)dt 
J-a+bt+Q 
r ^ r-a+bt+Q 
+ / / \p{a -bt + e)+v{Q-a + bt- e)]u{€)def{t)dt 
似 J-M 
+ / [pQ -s{a-bt + e- Q)]u{e)def{t)dt 
J^^ J-a+bt+Q 
/•l-M r-a+bt+Q 
+ / / [p{a -bt + e)-hviQ-a-^bt- €)]u{e)def{t)dt 
J f i ^ J-a+bt 
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f 學 fM 
+ / / \p{a -bt + e) + v{Q -a-\-ht- e)]u{t)def{t)dt. (3.10) 
J让-％+M J-a+bt 
and similarly, 
^ ^ ^ = —^^ + (p + s _ V)fC-Q广 M ) + … � f Ula + Umt)dt 
OQ 0 J a~M b 
a —Q + Al 
- (p + s-f；) [ “ U{-a-\-bt + Q)f{t)dt. (3.11) 
J a — Q—M 
Surprisingly, we can see that formula (3.9) and (3.11) are the same. Checking 
the second derivative of nd’R(Q) with respect to Q, 
例 ( 3 . 1 2 ) 
It is quite obvious that (3.12) is less than 0，so 7rd’i?(Q) is a concave function. 
Therefore, setting the formula (3.11) equal to zero, we can find the optimal 
order quantity for independent retailer, Qr, which is a global maximum. 
Compare to the 2M again, if Q,. > 2M, then the 7rd’i?(Q”）satisfies formula 
(3.8); and if Qr < 2M, then the TTd,R(Qr) can be calculated by formula. (3.10). 
Considering the case with rebate policy, the retailer's expected profit is 
. a + M 
ttkAQ) = 7Td,R{Q) + ^U “ it-t*)iQ-Qr)f{t)dt. To find the optimal order 
quantit}^ in this scenario, we take derivative of T^ K^ R(Qr)-
二 + . - ^ v - v f - ^ U[-a + U)mdt 




' U ( - a + bt + Q)f{t)dt 
-Q-M 
十 A^f 
b (t-t*)f(t)dt. (3.13) -- 2 0 
例 ^ ^ ^ ^ ) — ( 3 . 1 4 ) 
Because (3.14) equals to (3.12) which is less than 0，the nf�’R(Qr) is also 
a concave function. If we substitute Qr into (3.13)，谷丑(冗，is positive, so 
the zero point of Q*, must be at the right side of Q,., i.e. Q* > Qr. 
Then, we can say that the total profit "pie" is enlarged. 
3.2.2 Multiplicative Random Variable 
On the other hand, if there exists a random variable rj which affects the 
demand in a multiplicative way, such like x{t) = a — bt^r). Because the x{t) 
is a decreasing function of t, 77 must be positive and it also can not be infinite 
(if 77 equals to infinite, for any realized temperature t demand x{t) could be 
less than zero). So, we suppose 77 G (0, m] and t e (—0 0，T h e n without 
the rebate policy, the expected profit for the retailer is: 
rm r ' - ^ 
TTdAQ) = / { / " \pQ-s{a-htr]-Q)]f{t)dt 
JQ ^ J-00 
+ j:树仅一柳、+ viQ-a + btr))]f{t)dt^vir})dr). 
1>1 
where v{-) is the probability density function of rj. Similar to the above 
approach, take derivative of 7rrf,/?(Q) with respect to Q, 
Define Qr, which satisfies 〜 忽 二 0. Because 
d^T^dAQ) p + s j ^ a-Q 
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It is easy to know that TTd,R{Q) is a concave function. 
The rebate policy now involved in this multiplicative fashion. The ex-
pected profit of retailer is: 
m g—Q 
TTKAQr) = -wQ + [ I [ \pQ - s{a 一 btr] — Q)]f{t)dt 
Jo J-oo 
r念I 
+ / [p(a - btr]) + — a + btr})]f{t)dtjvirj)dr] 
J守 
( t - n ( Q - Q r ) f m , 
and 
^ = … + 例 F ( 罕 ) ] } 他 
Jt {t - t*)f{t)dt. (3.15) 
The optimal order quantity, Q*, is zero point of formula (3.15). Prom the 
above discussion and 
d'^TTKjiiQr) p + s-v a-Q 
dQi = 
we can know that such Q* is larger than Q,. which is the optimal quantity 
without rebates. 
3.3 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter studies a single period model with different types of correlation 
between demand and temperature - perfectly correlated and partially corre-
lated. Perfect correlation means the demand and temperature are one-to-one 
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correspondent. The demand distribution depends completely on the distrib-
ution of temperature, which is exposed to both retailer and manufacturer. If 
demand and temperature are partially correlated, then there exists an inde-
pendent random variable, besides temperature, to affect the demand. In all 
of these demand functions, temperature is negative-correlated with demand. 
We construct a rebate scheme to improve the expected profit for the 
both sides. In order to achieve this, such a scheme makes sense only if the 
retailer orders more units and the realized temperature is higher than the 
strike one at the same time. The first requirement is to protect the benefit 
of the manufacturer, and the second prerequisite can be used to split the 
incremental profit. 
After utilizing this scheme in the perfectly correlated case, we explore 
that if the rebate coordinates the whole supply chain, only the retailer can 
improve the expected profit; otherwise, both sides benefit from this rebate. 
Then, we prove that in the partially correlated cases the results are preserved. 
In the following chapter, we will show the performance of the rebate scheme 
in a risk-averse supply chain. 
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Chapter 4 
Rebate Scheme in a 
Risk-Averse Supply Chain 
So far, we have discussed the rebate scheme in a supply chain with risk-
neutral agents. While in many managerial situations, a budgeted profit is 
established, and managers may be more interested in maximizing the proba-
bility of meeting this budget than concentrating on whether the target level 
is exceeded or barely attained. In this chapter, we will study the rebate 
scheme in an optimal decision making problem involving constraints limiting 
the retailer and the manufacturer's downside risk. 
We consider the downside risk of a retailer as the probability that his 
realized profit is less than or equal to his specified target profit. Let o^ be 
the target profit, then the downside risk of the retailer is defined to be the 
probability that his profit is no greater than a'”. We want to choose an order 
quantity Q R SO as to maximize the channel expected profit 'ITR{Q) + 
while specifying that the retailer's actual profit should not fall below his 
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target profit level of o^ with a probability exceeding a specified pr. 
For the manufacturer, if there is no rebate, his profit is Ud,M{Q) = {w -
c)Q, which is deterministic and equivalent to the expected profit. When he 
offers a rebate scheme to the retailer, the realized profit becomes IIK^M{Q) 二 
(w — c)Q — k{t — t*){Q — Qk), which is uncertain and depends on the realized 
temperature t. We assume that the manufacturer do not want to suffer a 
revenue loss from the rebate to subsidize the retailer, therefore he sets a, risk 
level Pm to control the downside risk that his realized profit under the rebate 
scheme is lower than the case without rebates. Then mathematically the 
decision problem is: 
(P) max TTR{Q)+7TMiQ) 
s.t. P{nH(Q) < ar} < Pr (4.1) 
P i ' ^ K M i Q ) < ^ d , M { Q r ) } < A n . ( 4 . 2 ) 
This problem can be traced to Telser (1955) and the target level (or 
disaster level of income), o^，could be associated with bankruptcy or with 
something less drastic. While if the retailer is loss averse, zero can be set as 
the target level . We first consider the problem with a perfectly correlated 
demand and the shortage cost s = 0. The case of s > 0 will be discussed in 
the next section. 
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4.1 Case of Perfectly Correlated Demand 
4.1.1 Without a Shortage Cost 
Note that the objective (P) is indeed a standard newsvendor problem, with-
out the downside risk constraint (4.1). Because demand is one-to-one cor-
respond to temperature, the optimal order quantity for retailer is Qr = 
Now, we let QR be the optimal solution to problem (P) under 
the risk constraints (4.1). 
Propos i t ion 4.1. For any target profit level ov, there exists a critical order 
quantity 
Q . = (4.3) 
p — w 
such that for an order quantity Q < Qa, the downside risk is one, and 
for Q > Qa, if there is no shortage cost then the downside risk is 1 — 
which is an increasing function of Q. 
Proposition 4.1 indicates that while the order quantity is lower than the 
critical level, this leaves the retailer under the target level with probability 
one. To limit the risk in a safe level, suppose the retailer will order a quantity 
which is larger than the critical level, i.e., the relationship Q > Qa always 
hold true. 
Without Rebate 
We first consider the scenario without a rebate, the demand function is x{t)= 
a — bt. Then the transfer payment T •= wQ, and the corresponding profit 
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for the manufacturer is = T — cQ = {w — c)Q. While for the retailer, 
her realized profit H .^/i = p min{Q, + v{Q — x{t))'^ — wQ. In figure 
4.1, the line with triangles represents the retailer's realized profit given an 
order quantity Q. With the increasing of temperature, this line goes down 
and crosses the target level o^ at ti. 
6 0 0 0 0 -1 r 
^ S L ： Okr(QKR)； 
二 _」…：•-…二二 ： ^ ^ a , 
2 0 0 0 0 - ； ！ 
I 1 1 0 ； 1 ； 1 1 
-6 -4 -2 0 ti 2 t2 4 6 
Temperature 
Figure 4.1: Realized profit for the retailer with s = 0 
Then the retailer's downside risk is F{nci,R(Q) < ov} = P{Ild,R{Q) < 
aMt) > Q}P{x{t) > Q} + P{TldAQ) < < Q}P{x{t) < Q}. If 
x(t) > Q, then n^ ,/? = pQ - wQ, therefore P{Ild,R{Q) < o^} == 0. [From 
Proposition 4.1, we know that Q > Otherwise, if x{t) < Q, then 
P{U,i^r{Q) < ar] = P{x{t) < … - 二 B e c a u s e the demand function is 
x{t) = a — bt, we have ti = [a -(…二�…]/6. Therefore 
< a ,} < 1 - F{h) < A,. (4.4) 
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Taking the first derivative of the left hand side, 
< g ,} _ w-u 
S g = 胸 - � . 
The above inequality indicates that the probability is increasing with respect 
to Q, which means the more products the retailer ordered, the bigger risk 
to fall beneath his target level. Let Qr be the maximum Q which satisfies 
the risk constraint (4.4). If the order quantity Q,, < Qp^ , then the risk-averse 
retailer orders QR, otherwise, he orders QJ^. Hence QR = min{Q,., Q]^}. 
With Rebate 
Under the rebate scheme, we set QK = QR, then the manufacturer's realized 
profit is 
iiKMiQ) = c)Q - kit — -
Because the rebate is paid only when Q > Qn, We assume that the retailer 
will order a quantity which is more than Q^. According to the risk constraint 
(4.2), the manufacturer's downside risk is 
P{nK,MiQ) < 兀 d , A A Q R ) } 
=P{(w - c)Q - k(t - — Q丑)+ c)Qn} 
二 力 〉 ! + 力 ” 
rC 
In order to control the risk no larger than 爪々，the manufacturer only needs 
to set an appropriate strike temperature to satisfy: 
f > F - ' i l - P m ) - { i u - c ) / k . (4.5) 
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This condition is just correlated with the temperature distribution, rebate, 
and the specified pm. There is no need for the manufacturer to know the 
retailer's cost and price. As long as the above inequality holds, the manu-
facturer can protect his realized profit. 
The retailer's realized profit under the rebate scheme is: 
UkAQ) 二 P mm{Q, a;^} + v{Q — x(t))+ - wQ + k{t — t*)+{Q - Qr^. 
Using the same approach as no rebate, it is easy to see the probability for 
the retailer to achieve her target level P{IIK^R{Q) < o^} equals 1 - F(力2) 
(illustrated by the line with squares in Figure 4.1), where t) — + 
v{Q — x(t)) -wQ + kit — r)+(Q — QR)+ > ar} = [-{p — v)a + (w -
v)Q + kt*(Q - Qr)+ + ar]/lk(Q - — b(p -…].If the retailer does 
not purchase a larger quantity, then t2 = ti and retailer's risk of failing to 
achieve earnings target will not change under this rebate scheme. Therefore, 
we assume that the retailer will order more, i.e., Q > QR. In order to find 
the relationship between this risk and order quantity Q, again we take the 
derivative of P{n/c,/?(Q) < o^} with respect to Q. 
dP{NK,R(Q) < ar} .dt2 
—(p — v)lb(kf* + w - v ) - ak] 一 kar} 
When a , > a{p-v)-Qn{w-v)-'-^{kr+w-v)三 a/<，們"〜？严"�} > 
0. Because 0 < a^ c < a,. < QFI{P-W), we can let QKR denote the maximum 
Q to satisfy the retailer's risk constraint P{UK^R{Q) < ov} < A-； then re-
tailer's optimal order quantity with rebates is min{(5c, QKR}三 QKR. On the 
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other hand, if ov < a x , the probability P{IlK^fi{Q) < Qv} is decreased with 
respect to Q, then the retailer can order up to Qc to reduce the downside 
risk and maximize the her revenue. 
Propos i t i on 4.2. If the problem (P) has a solution, then the solution with 
rebates is greater than the solution without rebates. 
P{nK(Q) < a,} 
1 1 f-
丨 / ： Without rebate ； 
Po "i r -：；^ ： With rebate : 
0.8 - i i • 
I 
0.6- I ^ ^ I I 
\ … 
0 . 4 - L / ^ 一 - - 一 一 一 丨 i 
—一 I 丨 
0.2 - 丨 丨 I 
, \Qa QR QKR \QC GL Q 
0 H 1 ‘ 1 ‘ 1 1 H 1 ‘ 1 
9200 9600 10000 10400 10800 11200 11600 12000 
Figure 4.2: Downside risk with respect to the order quantity 
Proof , (i) When AX > Q；”，the solution of (P) without rebates is QR = 
min{Qr, QR] and the solution under rebates is QKR = QC. So it is obvious 
that QKR > QR-
(ii) If Qk < Qv, then QKR = min{(5c, QKR}- First, we have QC > Qr-
Next, we compare Q r with Qf^ .^ Prom Figure 4.2, we have Qo which sat-
isfies P{nd’/?(Qo) < C^R} = P{TII<,R{QO) < O^R}- U Q A < Q < Q O , then 
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P { l l d A Q ) < ocr] > P { l i K A Q ) < av}; i i Q > Qo, then P { n � H ( Q ) < 
ar} < P{IIK,R{Q) < ctr}- Because when Q = ( ^ � h = max{i|px(i) +v{Qc — 
x(t)) - wQc + /c(t - t*)+(Qc - Qr^ > ar} and t： 二 max{t|p:r� + v(Qc -
x(t)) - wQc > ar}, h > h and 1 - F(ti(Qc)) > 1 - F(i2(Qc)). From 
P L ^ D A Q C ) < > P{TIK,R{QC) < CTR}, we proved that QC < QO-
Next, we analyze the solutions based on the feasible 
(i) If A) < A, < 1, because both 乂Q ) < o^} and 尸{!!/(’；?(� < a , } 
are incrasing functions, QR and QKR are strictly larger than Qc. Then QR = 
min{Q,., Q^} = QR, QKR = niin{Qc’ QKR} = QC, hence QKR > QR. 
(ii) If 0 < A’ < 1 - F(TI{QA)), there are two conditions: (a) when Q < 
Q A , from proposition 4.1, we have P{IIR{Q) < ov} = 1 > /？^, so problem 
P{n/?(Q) < AR} < PR has no solutions, (b) when Q > Qq = 
P{n,(Q) < a,,} 二 PMt) < ( … ) … ] 
p — V 
> < ( 二 ) 二 + , 二 P{t > = 1 - FUQ^)) > A,. 
Once again, there is no solutions for the problem (P). 
(iii) If 1 — F(ti(Qa)) < Pr < A), from the above discussion, we also have 
QKR > Q}I. Then QKR > QR exists and the proposition is true. 
The above proof shows that in the case of perfectly correlated demand 
without a shortage cost, the problem (P) has solutions if and only if ov and 
Pr satisfy 1 — F(ti{Qa)) < < 1. Under rebate policy, the probability for 
the retailer to reach her target is bigger, and the corresponding downside risk 
is smaller. So from the above proposition, it is straightforward to see that 
such a rebate scheme still can improve the performance of the whole supply 
chain under the risk constraints. 
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4.1.2 Shortage Cost 5 > 0 
Similar to the preceding subsection, now we study the problem (P) when the 
shortage cost 5 > 0. Because the retailer's shortage cost does not influence 
the manufacturer's risk constraint (as we mentioned in subsection 4.1.1)，we 
just discuss the retailer's risk in this subsection. 
In the case of s = 0, the realized profit decreases only if demand is 
less than order quantity, however in the present case the realized profit will 
decrease if demand is either greater or less than order quantity. Hence, a 
profit level of a^ is attained exactly at two different actual demand levels: 
(i) when the actual demand x{t) is less than Q, 
px — luQ + v(Q — x) = Qv，or x =———+ …. 
p-v 
(ii) when the actual demand x(t) is greater than Q, 
pQ — luQ — s{x — Q) = ctr, or x 二 么 ~ ~ 切 + "^)�~—. 
s 
P r o p o s i t i o n 4.3. For any target profit level ar and the corresponding critical 
order quantity Qa, if an order quantity Q < Qa, then the downside risk 
< Q',.} is one; if Q > Qa and the shortage cost s�0，then the 
downside risk is [ ( 工 - 】 广 ) ) + I _ 阶 I ( ( P - 叫 ” ) . 
Referring to Figure 4.3，when the shortage cost is positive, the retailer's 
realized profit without rebates corresponds to the line with triangles, this line 
crosses the target profit level a^ at two temperatures, t^  and 4^. Prom propo-
sition 4.3, we know that h = — 广 � ’ and U = ^r!((�”；_?+"”， 
so the downside risk is F{t3) + 1 - F ( “ ) . The line with squares in fig-
ure 4.3 presents the retailer's realized profit under the rebate scheme. Be-
cause !!/(’/? 二 p min{Q,a:(t)} + v{Q - x(t)y - s{x{t) - Q)+ - wQ + k{t -
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Figure 4.3: Realized profit for the retailer with s > 0 
力 — Qk), the intersection points of the profit line and the target level 
are 力5 = max{i|(p - w)Q - s{x{t) - Q) + k{t — t*){Q 一 Qk) < Qv}，and 
to = imn{t\{p-iu)x{t)-\-v{Q-x(t))-\-k{t-r){Q-Qf,) < av}. The retailer's 
downside risk < a,.} now becomes •F(力5) + 1 - F(艺6). Let Qr 
and QKR be the maximum order quantity to satisfy F\t3) + 1 —尸(亡4) < 
and (力5) + 1 — •F(亡6) < A- respectively, it's easy to find that Qj^  < QKI .^ 
Therefore, the proposition 4.2 is still true in the case of s > 0. 
4.2 Case of Demand with an Additive Ran-
dom Variable 
In the above section, the temperature and the demand is one-to-one corre-
spondent. Now, we study the case that the demand is partially correlated 
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with the temperature, and has a general expression rj), where 77 is an 
independent identically-distributed random variable with a cumulative dis-
tribution function C/(r/), and r] G [—M, Mj. For any given 77 and J > 0， 
x(t, 'q) — x{t + 6,77) > 0. In this case, the demand distribution is not sim-
ply the same as the temperature distribution. Prom the condition (4.5), 
the manufacturer's downside risk only depends on the temperature distribu-
tion no matter how the retailer's demand distribution changes, therefore the 
manufacture still can meet the constraint (4.2) by choosing a feasible strike 
temperature, which satisfies (4.5). 
Next, we discuss how the downside risk affects the retailer's order quantity 
P{^dji{Q) < Q；,.}. For a realized temperature t, there are three possibilities: 
First, there exists a lower bound of temperature t, so that when t < t, 
for any r] in its domain, x{t, 77) > Q. 
P{IldAQ\t <t)< « r } 
=P{pQ — slx{t, v)-Q]-^Q< o^r\t < t} 
s 
Because the demand is negatively correlated with the temperature,加公”)< 
0. We assume that 加 > 0, and for any given t, there exists an inverse 
function so that 77 = t). 
= 尸 綱 — 
二 尸 乂 ( ( … - � . 
Secondly, suppose t is an upper bound of temperature. When t > t, 
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x{t, r/) < Q for any given rj. 
/"{rWQI力 < ar} 
=P{px(t, T]) + v[Q - � ] - w Q < ar\t > t} 
= P 删 偷 、 ” ] 
p — V 
= i w ’ " ) , -
p — V 
Finally, if t < t < t, whether or not the order quantity Q meets demand 
totally depends on the value of rj. Prom x{t, rf) = Q, we assume that 加容’> 
0，and for any given t, there exists an inverse function so that 77 = t). 
Pi^dAQlt <t<t)<ar} 
二 尸{rid乂Q|i’r; € 卜 ikr”T-i(Q’ 力)j) < ar}P{v G [-M, x''{Q, t)]} 




Considering the feasible range of 77 and from the formula of total proba-
bility, we have 
尸{FMQ) < M 
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二 f- P{nd’/?WI力 S iO s c ^ ] / � c / i 
J — oo 
+ jt P{^dAQ\t <t<^< ar}f{t)dt 
roo 
+ I >t)< ar}f{t)dt 
J-oo S 
Jt S 
+ 化 〜’ “)}/⑴汝 
Ji p - y 
Again, we let Q'R is the maximum Q which satisfies < CXR} < 
the retailer's optimal order quantity is min{Q,., Q'/?}三 QR' 
While with rebates, retailer's profit function becomes UK f^t{Q) = nd’i?(Q) + 
k{t - t*)'^{Q — QR^. For any realized temperature t, the rebate part is a 
iiorinegative constant, so we can slightly change retailer's target level and de-
fine ctfcr = otr + k{t — — Qr)'^. Obviously, akr > Qv. Now, this is back 
to the no-rebate problem P{Uj^^ri(Q) < o^} = P{Jid’R(Q) < cukr}- Suppose 
Q,KR = max{Q|尸{n/(’/?(Q) < o^} < PR}, Because the order quantity Q is 
increasing with respect to a,., it is easy to know that Q'J^-R > Q'R, SO as to 
prove that Q'R < Q'八'尺’ where Q'I^R is retailer's optimal order quantity under 
risk constraint with rebate. 
In this partial correlated demand model, our rebate scheme still can im-
prove the expected profit of the risk-averse retailer. 
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4.3 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the rebate performance in a risk-averse supply chain, 
and both parties in this channel have a downside risk constraint. Without 
rebates, the manufacturer's realized profit only depends on the retailer's or-
der quantity and is fixed, while after offering a rebate to the retailer, his 
profit fluctuates with the realized temperature. The higher the realized tem-
perature, the more profit he can get. In order to control his downside risk, 
the manufacture need to set the strike temperature appropriately. For the 
risk-averse retailer, we studies the two cases: no shortage cost and positive 
shortage cost. In both cases, the retailer has to choose a maximum order 
quantity under the risk constraint, and her expected profit still can be im-
proved by our rebate scheme, not only to the perfectly correlated demand 
but also to the partially correlated demand. In the next part of this thesis, 
we provide some numerical studies to show in detail how the rebate scheme 




In this chapter, several results discussed above are numerically illustrated, 
and additional insights are obtained. Recall that the analytical results in 
previous chapters do not assume any particular temperature distribution, or 
correlation between the temperature t and random variable e. 
We start from examples for the rebate scheme in a risk-neutral supply 
chain, the analysis of perfectly correlated demand model provides a bench-
mark for all the later examples, then in the partially correlated demand 
model, a detailed investigation is made to show the performance of the rebate 
scheme under normally distributed temperature with different strike temper-
ature t*, rebate per unit, demand sensitivity to temperature, and practical 
weather data. 
In the second section, we study the numerical examples for the risk-averse 
agent, and the overall summary is shown in the last section. 
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5.1 Risk-Neutral Supply Chain 
5.1.1 Perfectly Correlated Demand Model 
Consider a risk neutral retailer selling a weather-linked product, whose de-
mand is perfectly correlated with temperature. A net retail price is $9.00， 
and a manufacturing cost is $2.00. Assume a shortage cost is $1.00 for the 
retailer and each overage item has a salvage value of $1.00. The manufac-
turer's current policy is to charge the retailer $5.00 for each item and not 
offer rebates. For the basic demand model we set: 
a = 10000, b = 1000, p = 9, s = l, w = 5, c = 2, v = 1. 
First, we test with the temperature following the normal distribution. If 
t � 7 V ( — 5，4 ) ’ then Qr — 15,279 and the expected profits of manufac-
turer and retailer are: TTd,M{Qr) = $45,837 and nd,R(Qr) = $52,889, re-
spectively. When manufacturer sets the strike temperature t* = —5 and 
offers the retailer with a rebate of $3 per item, the optimal order quantity 
Q* becomes 16,842, and corresponding profits are TiK^MiQ*) = $46,786 and 
T^K,R{Qr) — $54,633. Then, it is obvious that both the manufacturer and 
the retailer benefit from the rebate policy. 
5.1.2 Partially Correlated Demand Model 
In the perfectly correlated model, there is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween demand and temperature. However, in reality, temperature is not the 
only factor to affect the demand. In order to show the partial correlation 
between them, we modify the demand function so that x{t) = a — bt + e, 
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where e is a random variable which is independent to t. The following table 
5.1 illustrates the difference between expected profits, when e is in different 
ranges. All the values remain the same as in the previous example, and e 
follows the uniform distribution on [—M, M]. 
e Without Rebate With Rebate Improvement 
M 'KD,R T^DM TTK、R retailer manufacturer total 
100 52886 45840 54630 46788 64.8% 35.2% 2692 
200 52877 45840 54624 46789 64.8% 35.2% 2696 
333 52856 45843 54608 46795 64.8% 35.2% 2704 
500 52815 45846 54578 46804 64.8% 35.2% 2721 
Table 5.1: Random variable in the additive model 
Strike temperature 
The strike temperature is an important decision variable in this rebate scheme. 
To illustrate each member's improvement of profit with respect to strike tem-
perature t*, we use Dm, A- and Dc to represent the incremental profit of 
manufacturer, retailer, and the whole channel respectively. From Figure 5.1， 
we can see, if temperature follows a normal distribution 4) and rebate 
k 二 $3.00，Dm is unimodal, while Dr is monotonic decreasing with respect 
to t*, which means there exists an unique strike temperature to bring the 
manufacturer the maximum profit improvement; and the retailer reaches the 
maximum improvement only when the manufacturer is no better off. 
Keeping the other parameters same as before, the manufacturer can ob-
tain the maximum improvement (^$1350) by setting the strike temperature 
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around -4.5(C). If the strike temperature is set to be -5.376(C), then the 
retailer obtains the whole incremental profit (?^$2868), which implies when 
t* = -5.376, the necessary condition for coordination J^{t-t*)f{t)dt = w—c 
is met. 
3500 1 ； -•Dm i 
3000 - i -«-Dr i 
2500 - \ \ j 
2000 - \ 、 
1 1500 - . 
1000 -
500 - / 
0 ——/-n 7 ^ � 个 r * . 
-5 -4 -3 - 2 - 1 0 1 
-oOO 丄 
Strike temperature 
Figure 5.1: Profit improvement changing with respect to strike temperature 
In the figure 5.1, Dm and Dr cross at -4.747(C), which means at this point 
the manufacturer and the retailer have the same profit i m p r o v e m e n t 1 2 3 5 ) . 
All three profit curves close to zero when t* is increasing. This result shows 
that if the strike temperature is set too high, the probability for the realized 
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Figure 5.2: Profit improvement changing with respect to rebate 
Rebates 
To check another decision variable - rebate k, we draw the Figure 5.2 with t � 
yV(—5’ 4) and t* = —5. Because the rebate feasibility k < w—c (manufacturer 
will not set a rebate which exceed his margin), the domain of k should be 
[0,4], where if /c = 0 that is equivalent to no rebate case. Figure 5.2 shows 
that the retailer's profit improvement Dr is increasing with respect to k, Dm 
and Dc are concave functions, where D � t a k e s maximum at around 3.7599($) 
(=kw) ’ Dm reaches its maximum around 2($) and drops below zero after 
ku,. This proves our conclusions in the last chapter that when k G [0’/cj 
both parties will benefit from the rebate scheme. Moreover, note that the 
manufacturer and retailer can share the incremental profit when k = $2.548， 
$1235 each. This result is equivalent to splitting the total incremental profit 
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by the strike temperature in the last subsection. 
Demand Sensitivity to Temperature 
111 the above examples, the demand function is x{t) — a —bt + e, and b/a is set 
to be 0.1. This ratio of b/a can be regarded as the sensitivity of demand to 
changes in temperature, a higher value related to a steeper demand change. 
The samples presented in the following Table 5.2 demonstrate how such a 
ratio affect the manufacturer's and retailer's profit. In all the five cases, 
the temperature follows normal distribution N{—5,4), t* = —5 and e G 
[-200,200]. We first calculate fc切=3.7599，then still let k = 3. Let An, Dr 
represent the additional gain of manufacturer and retailer respectively under 
rebate policy, and Dc denotes the total improvement of the supply chain. It 
is clear to see the better performance with a higher ratio of b/a. 
b/a a b Qc Qr Ql An Dr D� 
0.08 10000 800 15958 14224 15478 760 1399 2159 
0.10 10000 1000 17446 15280 16845 948 1747 2696 
0.12 10000 1200 18934 16336 18213 1138 2095 3233 
0.15 10000 1500 21166 17919 20266 1423 2619 4042 
0.20 10000 2000 24886 20559 23686 1896 3490 5386 
Table 5.2: Performance under Different Sensitivity Ratio 
Performance on Historical Data 
Table 5.3 presents historical seasonal temperature statistics of the United 
States from 1971 to 2000. All the data are obtained form the National 
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Climate Data Center (NCDC)i，and here we just choose some regions with 
typical data. Average and Std Dev stand for the mean and standard deviation 
of element for all month values for the given period of record. Win, Spr, 
Sum, Aut and Temp are abbreviations of Winter season (Dec-Feb), Spring 
season (Mar-May), Summer season (Jun-Aug), Autumn season (Sep-Nov) 
and Temperature (degree F) respectively. 
State/Region Element Win-Temp Spr-Temp Sum-Temp Aut-Temp 
Florida Average 59.4 69.9 81.0 72.7 
Std Dev 2.3 1.4 0.8 1.3 
Iowa Average 21.7 48.2 71.6 49.8 
Std Dev 4.3 2.8 1.6 2.0 
Michigan Average 21.7 42.6 66.2 47.3 
Std Dev 3.3 2.5 1.7 1.9 
North Dakota Average 12.2 41.1 66.6 42.0 
Std Dev 5.7 3.5 1.9 2.3 
Conterminous Average 33.2 52.0 71.9 53.9 
U.S. Std Dev 2.3 1.3 0.8 1.1 
Table 5.3: Area-Weighted Seasonal Temperature, 1971-2000 
In order to show the negative effect of climate on product sales, we use 
the data in Winter season only, e.g. the winter temperature of Florida follows 
7V(59.4, 2.32) distribution in the period from 1971 to 2000，and let the strike 
temperature t* be the normal mean. Because all the temperatures are shown 
iThe National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) is part of the Department of Commerce, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the National Environ-
mental Satellite, Data and Information Service (NESDIS). 
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in Fahrenheit and the difference between normal means due to latitude is very 
big, we change b to 125. The incremental expected benefit of manufacturer 
and retailer under different temperature pattern are reported in Table 5.4, 
where E,n and Er are the expected profit of manufacturer and retailer without 
rebate. 
State/Region Temp Distr E爪 Er D饥 Dr D^ 
Florida 7V(59.4，2.32) 10139 6703 292.31 311.08 603.39 
Iowa iV(21.7，4.32) 28850 19951 329.4 924.76 1254.16 
Michigan 7V(21.7’ 3.32) 28919 20396 436.35 407.12 843.47 
North Dakota 7V(12.2’ 5.72) 33502 22892 448.34 1210.3 1658.64 
U.S. 7V(33.2’2.32) 23239 16528 292.31 311.08 603.39 
Table 5.4: Rebate Performance under Different Climates 
Comparing the results in Table 5.3, the following observations are in 
order: (1) for different temperature distributions with the same mean and 
other parameters are equivalent, the higher standard deviation leads to a 
higher expected return and more incremental profit; (2) under the same 
standard deviation, sales are better in the colder region but the identical 
profit improvement has been achieved. 
5.2 Risk-Averse Supply Chain 
The following examples demonstrate the logic of the above analysis in Chap-
ter 4. In the first example, we assume that only the retailer is risk-averse, 
and she wish the probability of her realized profit below 90% of the expecta-
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tion is not larger than (3r. The temperature follows the normal distribution 
•/V(0，1) and all the external parameters are same as before. 
a = 10000, h = 1000, p 二 9’ s 二 1， w; == 6, c = 2, v = 1. 
Suppose the demand function is x(t) = a — bt + e, where e is an independent 
random variable and follows a uniform distribution on [-200,200]. First, 
setting the first order condition (3.9) to zero, we can find the risk-neutral 
retailer's optimal order quantity Qr is 9859，and her corresponding expected 
profit is $26421. Next, if the manufacturer offers retailer a rebate with k = $3 
per unit and strike temperature t* = —1, then the retailer's optimal order 
quantity Q* becomes 10867 and the expected profit is $27965. Then, the 
performance has been improved 5.84 percent by rebate. 
The following example takes the risk constraint from both sides into 
account. In a risk-averse supply chain, the manufacturer wants the prob-
ability that the rebate can improve his profit to be larger than 60%, i.e. 
P { I I K ^ M { Q ) < (U) - c)Qr} < 0.4; and the retailer wishes the probability of 
her realized profit below 90% of the expectation without rebate is no larger 
than 10%, i.e. P{Ud,R(Q) < 23779} < 0.1. First, it's easy to know that 
the strike temperature should be larger than -1.08(C). To keep consistent 
with the above example, we still choose t* = —1. Then by using Matlab, we 
get the maximum feasible solution Q'R 二 9159，which is less than Q^.. So 
Q'R 二 Q'R and the relative expected profit without rebate is $25613. Under 
the rebate policy, we can calculate the maximum order quantity with the 
risk constraint, Q'KR, which is 11816 and greater than Q*. So the retailer 
can still order 10867 units and get her maximum expected profit $27965. It 
seems very strange that under the risk constraint, the retailer orders less but 
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earns more. Actually it is because when there is a risk constraint, the retailer 
can obtain the rebate from a lower lever without risk Qk = Qr, and with 
risk QK = QR {QR = MM{Qr, QR}). Compare the expected profit under the 
risk control, we can see that the retailer's expected return is 9.18% higher 
than no rebate scenario. 
5.3 Brief Summary 
In this chapter, several results discussed in the chapter 3 and 4 have been 
numerically illustrated. We start from the perfectly correlated demand case 
in subsection 5.1.1，the results show that the rebate scheme improves the 
expected profit for both sides. Then based on the partially correlated model, 
section 5.1.2 studies the influences of several main parameters on the supply 
chain performance. We first illustrate how the independent random variable 
e influences the expected profit for both side. Then, the strike temperature 
and the rebates can be used to split the incremental profit in any proportion 
between the manufacturer and the retailer. In both cases, the manufacturer 
has a unimodal profit curve, and his improved profit is coincident with the 
retailer's at two points - one is zero point and both sides can not benefit from 
the rebates; at the other point, they share the total additional profit caused 
by the rebate scheme. We also show in the figure 5.1 and 5.2 that only when 
the retailer obtain the whole additional profit, the supply chain coordina-
tion is achieved. The following subsection studies the demand sensitivity to 
temperature and the rebate performance on historical climate data. 
In section 5.2, we show the numerical performance of rebate scheme with 
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risk-averse agents. In this supply chain, each agent has its own risk toleration, 
the retailer orders a quantity first, then the manufacturer offers a appropriate 
rebate scheme to share the uncertain weather risk with the retailer. From 
the examples, we can see our rebate scheme can improve the expected profit 
of both risk-averse manufacturer and retailer, and in our settings, such an 
improvement is quite observable. Generally speaking, our rebate scheme 
positively affects the profit of the whole supply chain in both risk-neutral 




In this thesis, a single-period pricing/ordering problem of a weather-related 
product has been investigated. We have proposed a rebate scheme for the 
supply chain, which can improve the profit of both the manufacturer and the 
retailer. In accordance with the formulae listed in chapter 3, such a scheme 
can be accomplished by the manufacturer, setting a strike temperature to 
offer rebates and the rebate credit per unit offered to the retailer. 
In the case where the product demand is negatively correlated with the 
temperature, by creating a rebate scheme linking a weather index, the manu-
facturer can induce the retailer to behave in a way that reflects the marginal 
revenue of the rebate while shielding the manufacturer from the full cost of 
doing so. To the perfectly correlated demand, the distribution can be known 
because of the complete information on the distribution of temperature. Fur-
ther, if the demand is only partially correlated with respect to temperature, 
not one-to-one correspondent, this thesis demonstrates that under such a re-
bate scheme, the manufacturer can also induce the retailer to order a larger 
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quantity by sharing the adverse effects of climate. 
The fourth main chapter of the thesis discusses about a risk-averse supply 
chain. The retailer orders a lower quantity caused by the downside risk 
constraint, then the manufacturer chooses an appropriate strike temperature 
and offers a rebate scheme to the retailer. Again, we have shown that this 




Matlab Source Code 
Part of Code for the Example in Section 5.3 
a = 10000; 
b = 1000; 
p = 9; % retail price 
5 = 0;% shortage cost 
lu = 5; % wholesale price 
c = 2; % manufacturing cost 
'< ;=! ;% salvage cost 
mean = —5; % 亡〜N(mean, var) 
var = 2; 
ts 二 一5; % strike temperature 
syms t; % temperature 
km = (w- c)/eval(int((t - ts) * normpdf{t, mean, var),ts, a/b)) 
% maximum rebate per unit 
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k 二 3 % rebate per unit 
rebate = A: * eval{int((t - ts) * normpdf{t, mean, var),ts, a/6)); 
M = 200; % range of e 
Qa = 9859 % Qr in additive model, Let pi_Qa_deriv=0 
pi-Qa.deriv = -w {p + s - v) ^ normcdf{{a - Qa + M)/b, mean, var) + 
v-v*eval{int({-a + 6*i + M)/2/M * n o r m p d f ( t , mean, var), (a-M)/6, (a+ 
M)/b))-{p+s-v)^eval(mt({-a+h^t+Qa+M)l2/M^norrnpdf{t, mean, var), {a-
Qa - M)/b, {a-Qa + M)/b)) 
syms z； % z = e 
Pi-Qa = -w*Qa+evaliint{eval{int({p^Qa-s*{a-bH+z-Qa))/2/M, -M，M))* 
normpdf(t, mean, var), - i n f , (a-Qa- M)/b)) + eval(int(eval{int{{p*Qa -
s^{a-b^t + z-Qa))/2/M, -a + b^t + Qa, M))^normpdf{t, mean, var), (a — 
Qa - M)/h, {a - Qa + M)/b)) + eval(int(eval(int((p + 
{Qa-a^-b^t-z))/2/M, —M、-a + 6*i + Qa)) *normpdf{t, mean, var), (a-
Qa - M)/b, {a - Qa + M)/h)) + ev al {int {eval {int ({p + 
{Qa - a + b * t - z))/2/M’ - M , M)) * norm,pdf{t, mean, var), {a - Qa + 
M)/6，(a - M)/b)) + eval(int{eval(mt{(p * (a - 6 * i + + i; * (Qa - a + 
h^t-z))/2/M, + M))*normpdf{t, mean, var), {a-M)/b, (a + M)/h)) 
QaK = 10867 % Qrstar in additive model which satisfies pLQa_K_deriv二0 
pi-Qci-K-deriv = —w + (p-^s — v)^normcdf((a — QaK + M)/h, mean, var) + 
v — v*eval{int{{-a + b^t-\-M)/2/M^normpdf{t, mean, var), {a-M)/b, (a + 
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M)/h))-(p+s-v)^eval[int({~a+h^t+QaK+M)l2lM^norrn'pdf(t, mean, var), (a— 
QaK-M)/h, (a—QaK+M)/b))+k*e”al(j/nt[(t—ts)*normpdf(t, mean, var),ts, (a+ 
M)/b)) 
Pi-QaK 二 —w * QaK + eval{int{eval {int ((p * QaK — s^ {a — b^t + z — 
QaK))/2/M, -M, M)) * normpdf{t, mean, var), —in/，（a - QaK - M)/b)) + 
eval {int(eval {int{{p * QaK - s^{a-b>^t + z - QaK))/2/M, —a + 6 * t + 
QaK, M)) * normpdf(t, mean, var), {a — QaK - M ) ( a — QaK + M) /b) ) + 
eval{int{eval{int{{p+力+ {QaK-a + h^t-z))/2/M, -M, -a + 
6*i + QaK))*normpdf{t, mean, var), (a-QaK-M)/b, (a-QaK + M)/b)) + 
eval{int{eval{int{{p*{a+ + {QaK-a + b*t-z))/2/M, -M, M))* 
normpdf[t, mean, var), {a — QaK + M)/b, {a — M)/b))+eval{int{eval{int{{p^ 
{a-bH+z)-\-V'i^{QaK-a+bH-z))/2/Ad, M))^norm'pdf(t, mean, var), {a~ 
M)/b, {a+M)/b))+k*eval{int({t-ts)*(QaK-Qa)*normpdf {t, mean, var), ts, (a+ 
M)/b)) 
Results: 
km = 3.6924 
k = 3 
Qa 二 9859 
pijQa-deriv = 0.0013 
Pi_Qa = 2.6421e + 004 
QaK 二 10867 
pi.QaJ<-deriv 二 8.7285e — 004 
Pi-QaK 二 2.7965e + 004 
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